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Crowding-out hypothesis asserts that in the presence of developed social obligations, 
social trust levels tend to be low. Empirical evidence of the crowding-out is however poor 
while this relationship is mainly studied under narrow assumption about unidimensionality of 
welfare state development operationalized through social spending as a percentage of GDP. 
The main objective of this study is to show that allowing for multidimensionality in welfare 
states provides more support for the crowding-out. The multidimensionality is formed around 
three axes: functional, outcome and qualitative. Functional dimension is defined on the basis 
of functions social policy performs taking as an example pension and unemployment 
spending. Outcome dimension accounts for the effects of decommodification and 
stratification on interpersonal and institutional trust. And, finally, qualitative dimension 
describes the impact of social provisions’ characteristics, namely their institutional design, 
delivery form and mode of financing on social trust levels. Empirical results generally support 
the idea that the sign in the relationship between welfare state and social trust depends on the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The role, the social capital performs at individual and societal level, spurred numerous 
researches about its recent dynamics and factors that may determine the speed and the 
direction of its change. Among the determinants, the welfare state development is the most 
controversial and often discussed one. More specifically, many argue that if the state gets into 
the business of organizing everything, people will become dependent on it and lose their 
spontaneous ability to work with one another (De Swaan, 1988; Fukuyama, 2000; Kumlin and 
Rothstein, forthcoming). This negative relationship was conceptualized in the ‘crowding-out’ 
hypothesis.  
The empirical evidence of crowding-out effects in social capital, in general, and social 
trust, in particular, is however controversial. Those scholars who suggest that with respect to 
certain elements of social capital the negative trend is really taking place (Putnam, 1995, 2000; 
Uslaner, 2000-2001; You, 2005) usually omit welfare state impacts from their analysis. Those 
who focus directly on this relationship generally provide empirical evidence of the positive or 
at least neutral influence of the welfare state development on people’s trust in others, 
participation in volunteer organizations and social networks, supportive behaviour in families 
and neighbourhoods (Rothstein, 2001; Hall, 1999; De Hart and Dekker, 1999; Van Oorschot 
and Arts, 2005). 
The main objective of this study is to test the crowding out hypothesis by applying a 
new approach based on the idea of multidimensionality of social policies and their effects on 
social capital formation. The latter is considered plausible due to the fact that the research 
conducted so far was mostly focused on careful measurement of the social capital while 
welfare state policies were treated as a single indicator without taking into account the 
diversity of social programs, variety of their characteristics, and differences in their impact on 
the social capital. This multidimensional approach consisting in many-sided description of 
welfare state development must help us to reveal in which instances and under which 
circumstances the crowding-out in social capital happens. The latter will have direct policy 
implication since it will make possible to conclude which policies and which of their 
characteristics lead to the erosion of social capital and which, on the contrary, tend to enhance 
pro-social behaviour.  
For the purpose of the research, we will limit the analysis of social capital to social 
trust. We adopt Barber’s definition of social trust as ‘socially learned and socially confirmed 
expectations that people have of each other, of organizations and institutions in which they 
live, and of the nature and moral social orders, that set the fundamental understanding for 
  2their lives (Barber, 1983). The distinction is done between interpersonal trust and institutional 
trust. The former is understood as the belief that most people can be trusted and which usually 
appears in the literature as generalized trust (Uslaner, 2000 – 2001). The latter reflects the 
confidence and faith of people in the public institutions and organizations.  
The organization of the paper is done as follows. First, some theoretical elaboration on 
the relationship betweens social trust and welfare state is provided. This is followed by the 
research design description and hypothesis formulation. In the next chapter, the effects of all 
three dimensions (functional, outcome and qualitative) are analysed. The paper concludes 
with the discussion of the findings of crowding-out effects in institutional and interpersonal 
trust.  
 
2.  Theoretical and empirical evidence of the crowding-out effects in social 
trust 
 
The analysis of the relationship between social trust and welfare state is usually based 
on the traditional assumption that the most important prerequisite for social capital to 
accumulate is the prevalence in the society of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic 
engagement. Welfare state development discourages, first of all, civic engagement and as a 
consequence the social capital levels in the society go down (Kumline and Rothstein, 
forthcoming). Alternative mechanisms of crowding-out include the erosion by welfare state of 
the ability of individual to work with one another (Fukuyama, 2000) or destruction by social 
policy of individual’s sense of responsibility for caring about family members and friends (De 
Swaan, 1988).  
The possibility of a positive impact of welfare state on social trust is as well discussed 
in the literature. Szeter (2000), for instance, sees the root of the positive relationship in the 
state’s function to keep the individual socially integrated when he or she has difficulties. 
Patulny (2005) continues this idea and suggests that welfare state activity aimed at supporting 
the individual may enhance both -bridging and bonding social capital. Knack and Zak (2001) 
also suggest that redistributive policies which lead to reduction of inequality may be 
considered an instrument of raising trust. Bonoli (2004) uses ‘backward induction’ 
mechanism to claim that the reduction in social spending may increase uncertainty which in 
its turn negatively affects social capital leading to its decline. The synergy between the state 
and the society is as well recognized as possible by Fox (1996), Evans (1996) and Heller 
(1996). In the recent literature, the discussion about crowding-out is concentrated on the 
question about the dependence of the final outcome on the institutional design of social 
provisions. Crowding-out is expected in the case of means-tested schemes while crowding-in 
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Kumllin and Rothstein, 2007).  
Empirical evidence is less controversial with respect to the relationship between social 
capital and social spending. In most cases, research generally finds positive and quite strong 
correlation between social expenditures and social capital as a synthetic construct or between 
social spending and one of the social capital elements (Art et al., 2003, Gaskin and Smith, 
1995, Salamon and Sokolovski, 2003 in Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005)  
Both theoretical and empirical studies
1 however possess in their vast majority one 
feature in common: they operationalize the welfare state development through social spending 
measured as a percentage of GDP. In doing so, they automatically run into difficulties which 
can be summarized in four main drawbacks. 
The first drawback of the research conducted so far consists in ignoring the possibility 
of ‘mixed’ effects of welfare state activity on social capital. This logic is especially clear if 
welfare states are scored on spending. By doing so we assume that all spending counts equally. 
As a result we ignore the fact that the spending actually reflects the bunch of policies and has 
a specific structure. These policies are different in their impact, outputs and outcomes and 
each of them affects social capital in its own way. Thus, if analyzing the effect of total 
spending, the changes in social capital are inevitably biased either by a policy absorbing the 
great share of expenditures or by a policy with the strongest influence.  
The second drawback is the ignorance of the notion of targeting. In each welfare state, 
there are policies which are applied exclusively to a certain population group (for instance 
pensioners) and hence the social capital of only this concrete group is subject to the direct 
pressure of change. Ignoring this nuance and generalizing the analysis to the whole population 
may result in the underestimation of the true impact of welfare state development on social 
capital formation. 
The third drawback consists in ignoring the fact that social spending levels are limited 
to ‘how’ dimension and do not reflect the actual level of benefits received by the individuals. 
The high total social spending may result from the fact that the selective benefits are quite 
high while the coverage rate is quite small. The similar level of total social spending may be 
                                                 
1 In total, the vast majority of studies conducted so far are developed around the question of the kind of influence 
the welfare state development causes on social capital formation. Researchers base their arguments on the 
assumption that the causal mechanism goes from the state to the trust. Recently, this assumption is however 
contested. Uslaner (2000), for instance, asserts that the direction of causality is the other way around and hence it 
is not the welfare state development that determines the trust, but vice versa, the trust determines the amount of 
GDP the state spends on social programs. For checking this assumption one needs, however, longitudinal data 
going back to the history when the initial formation of welfare state happened. Such data are not available; hence 
it is difficult to define the direction of causality between welfare state and social trust. For the purpose of our 
analysis, we rely on the traditional assumption that the causality goes from welfare state to social trust and not 
the other way around. 
  4obtained in the situation of high coverage rate but low benefit levels. As Forma (2002) 
noticed ‘Social expenditures as such do not tell very much about the principles or social rights 
according to which money is actually distributed’. Hence, when analyzing the ‘how’ 
dimension, we ignore not only the actual decommodification level, but also neglect the form 
of social stratification resulting from the state intervention in the social arena.  
The fourth drawback consists in ignoring the fact that each policy is designed and 
implemented in a variety of ways and hence each possesses certain characteristics. It is 
plausible to assume that these characteristics may lead to completely different effects on 
social trust levels. Some of them may enhance trust formation as in the case of non means-
tested schemes, some on the contrary erode trust levels as means-tested schemes do. 
Therefore, ignoring the qualitative side of social spending may lead to the biased results about 
their effects on social trust indexes.  
 
3.  Research design and hypothesis formulation  
 
The main idea of the research consists in the proposal that the crowding-out 
hypothesis is not robust, but depends on the way the welfare state development is 
operationalized. The latter suggests that in order to draw plausible conclusions about the kind 
of the relationship between social policy and social trust, it is necessary to look at different 
measures of welfare state development. We propose to use a multidimensional approach 
which tries to describe the state intervention in the form of social policies from different 
perspectives. The plausibility of using an approach of this kind is based on the idea that 
welfare state is a multi-faceted construct which is an outcome of many durable and interacting 
processes which reflect the specificity of economic, social and political conditions in which 
the welfare state formation happened. This resulted not just in a certain level of social 
spending, but as well in specific features of social rights and entitlements conditions, in 
different understanding of the necessity, scope and the size of the state intervention, in certain 
structure of welfare arrangements, and in a unique mechanism of their provision to the 
potential cliental. It is hence necessary to take account of all these specificities forming 
welfare state dimensions when analyzing the effects of social policy on social trust since it is 
plausible to expect that they lead to different types of the relationship with social trust.  
In defining the multidimensionality in welfare states, we base our research on the 
assumptions that each social program is intended to cover certain risks or contingencies, and 
is designed for certain group of people, namely those - experiencing those contingencies. 
Apart from that, we take into account the fact that the state intervention in the form of social 
policies results in a certain level of decommodification as well as in a certain form of social 
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which reflect the features of programs’ design and implementation, as well as financing 
conditions. In other words, one can derive three axes around which the multidimensionality of 
social policies is formed.  
The first one is functional axes, which takes into account different functions 
performed by the social policies, and which forms functional dimension. The functions are 
derived on the basis of the risk or contingencies which social policies are designed to cover. 
The distinction here applies the existence of policy specific effects on social trust levels. The 
first two drawbacks can be hence corrected by relating spending on certain social policies to 
the trust level of their direct recipients. For the purpose of the analysis, two main social 
provisions will be taken: pensions and unemployment benefits. The choice of these two 
welfare programs was based on the fact that these two provisions are convenient in terms of 
defining their target groups and forming a sub-sample of pensioners and a sub-sample of 
unemployed for conducting the analysis on the basis of the ESS data. In order to see whether 
specification of the crowding-out hypothesis through the isolation of the effects of these two 
social policies is reasonable or not, we include in our analysis total social spending. Their 
effect on the social trust indicators among the whole population will be used as a benchmark 
for comparison with policy specific effects of unemployment and pension spending on the 
social trust levels among their direct recipients. 
The second axis takes into account the final outcomes of social policies, namely the 
level of de-commodification and the form of stratification resulting from the state intervention. 
It can be called an outcome axis around which the outcome dimension is formed. This allows 
us to correct for the third drawback by separately analysing the effects of each dimension of 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology on social trust levels. In other words, we 
separately relate the level of decommodification and stratification to the social trust levels 
among individuals.  
The third axis can be called qualitative which takes account of the different policy 
characteristics to study their separate effects on social trust levels. The dimension formed 
around this axis can be as well called qualitative and it focuses on the effects the specificity of 
benefits’ design, delivery and financing has on social trust. We distinguish between four sets 
of characteristics. The first one takes into account the form of social provisions and we study 
the effects of cash benefits versus in-kind benefits. The second set accounts for the mode of 
financing of social programs where the distinction is done between contributions and general 
taxation. The third approach emphasises the institutional design of the welfare state which can 
be either universal or categorical. And, finally, we evaluate the effects of employment policies 
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policies.  
These three axes form the basis for multidimensionality of social policy effects on 
social trust formation. The latter constitutes a clear breakthrough in the analysis of social 
policies on interpersonal and institutional trust levels which consisted usually in relating the 
level of social spending to the trust indicators. This new approach allows us to grasp all 
possible effects the welfare state conducts on trust perception from different perspectives and 
go beyond the usual spending level. The latter permits, on the one hand, to describe the 
welfare state development in more details. On the other hand, this approach also gives a 
ground for better understanding of the mechanisms underlying the relationship between the 
level of welfare state development and social trust formation.  
The hypothesis for all three dimensions can be formulated as follows: more developed 
welfare state in its three dimensions must negatively co-vary with social trust indexes if the 
crowding-out hypothesis holds.  
 
4.  Data source  
 
The analysis is based on the European Social Survey which represents a new 
academically-driven survey designed to chart and explain the attitudes, beliefs and behavior 
patterns of Europe’s diverse population. The survey was conducted three times, but for the 
purpose of our research we limit the analysis to the first round which took place in 2002. The 
survey covers 23 nations, but we restrict our study to 13 countries. The selection of the 
countries is done based on the availability of the data for country-level variables. The 
following countries are included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
The total sample for the whole population includes 25828 cases. The sub-samples for 
pensioners and unemployed people contain respectively 5541 and 800 cases or 21.5 and 3.1 
percent of the pooled sample.   
 
5. Methods description  
 
The linear regression analysis is applied to detect the direct influence of relevant 
measures of welfare state development on respondents’ indicators on institutional trust
2 as 
well as on interpersonal trust. To assess the effects on social trust, the linear model of the 
                                                 
2 The choice of this method was done based on the fact, that institutional and interpersonal  trust can be 
considered continuous variables 
  7following form will be employed Yi = ß0 + ßi X i + εi  (Draper and Smith, 1998). The 
regression analysis will be separately conducted for each of the target sub-samples 
(pensioners, unemployed) and for the whole population sample. The final model can be 








Social_Trustij = ß0 + ß1 R_S_Spendingj+ ß2 Xi + ß3Zj + εij, 
where R_S_Spendingj – is a relevant measure of welfare state development, which is 
relevant social expenditures for the functional dimension, Xi – is a set of individual-level 
control variables, Zj – is a set of country-level control variables. The coefficient on 
R_S_Spending will measure an average change in the institutional or interpersonal trust 
scores which is associated with 1% change in the relevant measure of welfare state 
development when individuals’ and countries’ characteristics are held constant. Our 
expectations can be formed as follows: the crowding-out in social trust happens if the sign on 
the coefficient of relevant social spending is negative. Moreover, the difference in the value 
or/and sign on this coefficient for the sub-samples will indicate the presence of policy specific 
effects.  
The similar logic is used for analyzing the outcome and qualitative dimensions. More 
specifically, we substitute the relevant social spending with the measure of the level of 
decommodification and stratification. The support for crowding-out hypothesis is then 
obtained when the coefficients on these variables have a negative sign.  
For the qualitative dimension, we substitute relevant social spending with the measure 
of (1) universalistic versus categorical welfare programs, (2) general tax financing versus 
contributory financing, (3) in-kind versus cash benefits, (4) active versus passive policies. The 
support for crowding out is obtained in the case of having a negative sign on the relevant 
variables.  
The operationalization of the models will be done as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
3 Multiple linear regression is not a perfect method here since all un-modelled country information end-up 
pooled into the same single individual error terms of the model and hence individuals belonging to the same 
country will presumably have correlated errors, which violates one of the basic assumptions of multiple 
regression. Moreover, correlation in the residuals may as well lead to overestimation of significance level of the 
coefficients. Alternative methods of analysis – multi-level modelling- cannot be recognized advantageous in this 
case for two reasons. First, the number of countries at the second level is limited only to 13 which is too little to 
provide positive results for the significance test of the coefficients. And, second, small number of cases at the 
country level would not allow us to simultaneously control for all selected countries’ characteristics.  
  8Dependent variables 
As it usually appears in the literature we distinguish between two types of social trust: 
interpersonal trust and trust in institutions. Interpersonal trust is defined on the basis of the 
following question: ‘generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?’ Ten-point scale ranging from ‘no trust at 
all’ to ‘complete trust’ was used in order to describe people’s level of trust. Institutional trust 
is operationalized on the basis of the question about respondent’s level of confidence towards 
three public welfare institutions: the parliament, the legal system and the police. Answers to 
each question was measured on ten-point scale so that the synthetic variable institutional trust 
ranges from one to thirty reflecting correspondently ‘no trust at all’ to ‘complete trust’. The 
new scale provides quite high reliability level (0.774). 
 
 Independent variables 
The main independent variable is social spending which explicitly reflects the level of 
welfare intervention in the societal arrangements. We distinguish between total social 
spending
4, social spending on public pensions
5 and social spending on unemployment 
schemes, each of them is measured as a percentage of GDP. In order to avoid the impact of 
cyclical fluctuations in the GDP over the past years and the difference in economic 
performance across countries we calculate the average indicators of relevant social spending 
for the period starting from 1990 and up to the year preceding the survey – 2001. The main 
source for the data is Eurostat website (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, European System of 
Integrated Social Protection Statistics). This data source provides information on total social 
spending and social spending by functions.  
Apart from that, the welfare state development is operationalized through welfare 
regime types. The grouping of countries is based on Esping-Andersen’s typology: 
Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) form social democratic 
welfare regime. English-speaking countries (Ireland and United Kingdom) represent liberal 
type. Continental European and Mediterranean countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) are grouped into distinct conservative welfare regime 
type.  
Decommodification level is operationalized through benefit generosity index which 
represents the level of generosity of social benefits. The indicators were calculated by Scruggs 
and Allan (Scruggs and Allan, 2006) and made available to the public through their 
                                                 
4According to the definition of Eurostat (source of data) total expenditures on social protection contain: social 
benefits, which consist of transfers, in cash or in kind, to households and individuals to relieve them of the 
burden of a defined set of risks or needs; administration costs, which represent the costs charged to the scheme 
for its management and administration; other expenditure, which consists of miscellaneous expenditure by social 
protection schemes (payment of property income and other). The functions (or risks) are: sickness/healthcare, 
disability, old age, survivors, family/children, unemployment, housing, social exclusion not elsewhere classified. 
5 Pensions include old age, disability and survivor pensions as well as early retirement benefits.  
  9publications. We also use their stratification indexes for operationalizing stratification level in 
the countries of interest. The indexes were again obtained by replicating Esping-Andersen’s 
analysis of the stratification level (Scruggs and Allan, 2006).    
Categorization of the welfare state is operationalized through the number of 
occupationally distinct public pension schemes. Larger numbers point out at higher 
categorization while lower numbers indicate more universalistic approach. The data about the 
number of occupationally distinct public pension schemes are taken from Scruggs’s and 
Allan’s paper (Scruggs and Allan, 2006). Universalism is operationalized through the 
percentage of labour force coverage with three main social benefit schemes: unemployment, 
pension and sickness. 
The information about provision of social benefits in the form of in-kind and cash 
benefits is taken from the OECD web-site (http://stats.oecd.org) The main source of 
information about the percentage of social contribution and general revenues in the total 
amount of welfare state revenues is Eurostat web-site (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, 
European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics).  
Active spending is operationalized through the level of spending on active labour 
market policies measured as a percentage of GDP. Passive spending is respectively expressed 
through spending on passive labour market policies. The main source of information for both 
measures is the OECD web-site (http://stats.oecd.org).  
 
Control variables 
Among control variables we distinguish between country-level and individual-level 
characteristics. The overview of the literature on social trust suggests that the following 
characteristics should be controlled for at country level: country wealth, income inequality, 
corruption, percentage of Protestants living in the country and fractionalization level.  
Country wealth is measured through GDP in purchasing power standards per capita 
calculated as an average for 1995-2001 (source: Eurostat website: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, Eurostat Structural Indicators). Income inequality is 
operationalized through the ratio between the total income of the top 20% income group and 
that of the bottom 20% income group. The ratio is averaged out through the period 1995 – 
2001 (source: Eurostat website, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, Eurostat Structural 
Indicators). We operationalize corruption through perceived index of corruption annually 
published by the Transparency International Organization (www.transparency.org)
6. The 
                                                 
6 The index was taken for the year 1999 has higher values for the countries with less corruptive behaviour and 
low values for those with higher corruption level.  
 
  10percentage of Protestants living in each country is calculated on the basis of the World Values 
Survey. The fractionalization level is operationalized through fractionalization index 
calculated by Alesina et al. 
(http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls).   
  At the individual level we control, on the one hand, for socio-economic/demographic 
variables (age, gender, education, household income, employment status), on the other hand, 
we hold constant attitudinal, perceptual and behavioral causal mechanisms through which 
socio-economic/demographic variables may have an impact on trust (civic society activity, 
sociability,  political values, life satisfaction, religion and religiousness).  
Volunteering effects are controlled for by summing up the variables that have value of 
one if the individual is doing voluntary work for sport activity clubs, cultural/hobby, 
business/professional, consumer, humanitarian, environmental, peace, animal, religious or 
other voluntary organizations. The new variable reflects the number of memberships of the 
individual in voluntary organizations. The socializing variable is constructed on the basis of 
the question about the frequency of meeting with friends outside work which ranges on a 
seven point scale from ‘never’ to ‘every day’. ’Household income is measured on the basis of 
the ten-point scale individuals use in the ESS to self-rate their income status and which is 
divided into five groups forming five quintiles. Unemployment is controlled in our analysis 
by the dummy with other employment status as reference category (1=unemployed, 0=other). 
We also include dummies for Catholics, Protestants while all other religions are combine in 
the single group ‘other’. As the reference category we use the group of non-religious people. 
Religiousness in our analysis is an ordinary-scale variable constructed on the basis of the 
frequency of church attendance. Political stance is operationalized by constructing the ordinal 
variable reflecting the self-rated placement of the individual on a 10–point left-right scale. 
Education is measured by the highest degree obtained by the individual which is described on 
the basis of the 6-degree scale. They are further categorized in three distinct groups: the first 
comprises those with low education, the second - those with middle education, and the third - 
those with higher educational level. We operationalize the age variable by calculating the 
actual age of the respondents (in years) at the moment the survey was conducted and creating 
on its basis three groups: the first one comprises those between 15 and 29, the second - those 
between 30 and 44 and, finally, the third includes those aged 45 and older. To control for the 
gender of the respondents, we construct a dummy with following values: 1 for males, and 0 
for females. The life satisfaction variable is operationalized through the respondents’ answer 
about how satisfied or dissatisfied they are with their life measured on 10 point scale ranging 
from ‘extremely dissatisfied’ to ‘extremely satisfied’.  
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6.  The impact of welfare state development on social trust formation in the light 
of multidimensional approach: empirical evidence.  
 
This chapter focuses on the empirical results of our analysis of the relationship 
between different measures of welfare state development and social trust levels done in the 
light of multidimensional approach.  
 
Functional dimension  
Decomposition of social spending on functional basis provides more evidence of the 
crowding-out effects rather than the crowding-in (see Table 1). More specifically, for both 
types of trust, an increase in total social spending entrains a decrease in the level of 
confidence. Specification of the social spending allows to conclude that there is a case of 
policy-specific effects since a stronger negative effect was found for the subsample of 
pensioners while for the subsample of unemployed people, the positive influence is present
7. 
However, it is difficult to make inferences in the case of unemployment spending due to the 
fact that none of its coefficients is statistically significant. Nevertheless, their non significance 
can be attributed to a much smaller sample size compared to those for the pensioners and for 
the whole population. 
 Thus, the specification of total social spending on functional basis shows that despite 
the fact that total social spending may negatively affect social trust levels, not all social 
policies lead to the same result. Unemployment spending, for instance, may enhance trust 
formation as the analysis confirmed. The difference in the social spending influence on trust 
levels can be explained with the fact that each social policy has its specific mechanism linking 
it to social trust levels.  
One way of interpreting the difference in the effects of relevant social expenditures on 
social trust levels is to look at the links connecting individuals to the social protection system. 
In the case of the whole population, we have mixed respondents out of whom the vast 
                                                 
7 One may think that there is a possibility of self-selection in the functional dimension. It is not present for 
pensioners since it is natural and unavoidable to become a pensioner and everybody is exposed to the risk of 
entering retirement to the same extent, but it can be considered as possible for the unemployed people. Positive 
correlation of unemployment spending with social trust may indicate then that highly trusting unemployed 
individuals who have high regards about the state may rely more on the state’s help in the form of 
unemployment benefits and stay unemployed longer. On the contrary, people who have less confidence towards 
the state and count less on its support may try to get out of unemployment as soon as possible reducing in this 
way the duration of their unemployment spells. If self-selection mechanism works, then the unemployed people 
should have on average higher levels of trust compared to the other people. This logic contradicts however to the 
widely recognized fact that the unemployed people usually have lower levels of trust since unemployment 
negatively correlates with both forms of trust (Hall, 1999; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). It is hence possible to 
exclude the self-selection in the case of unemployed people as well.  
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them benefits from the welfare state provisions. In the case of pensioners and unemployed 
people, one deals with the net beneficiaries who usually no longer pay to the state any taxes or 
contributions, but they heavily rely on social provisions in the form of pensions or 
unemployment benefits. Hence, it is plausible to assume that contributors may form negative 
attitudes towards the state whose activities they finance since they usually pay more than they 
get from the welfare system. Explicit tax burden which is higher in the countries with more 
developed social obligations may negatively affect the respondents’ confidence towards the 
welfare institutions since it is implicit and unforeseeable to which extent they will benefits 
from the welfare state in the future which mostly happens in case they experience social risks. 
A low regard for the state and its activities in its turn forms the essential cultural, symbolic, 
psychological and experiential preconditions for citizens to have low trust towards each other.  
Net beneficiaries by contrast might tend to form positive attitudes towards the state 
since they directly benefit from the welfare system which provides the individuals with an 
alternative source of income keeping them in this way socially integrated. Both pensions and 
unemployment spending should thus positively correlate with social trust levels. The analysis 
confirms this only in the case of the unemployed respondents while pension spending tends to 
be negatively associated with social trust levels. This may happen because the pensioners may 
consider the amount they get from the state in the form of pensions less than what they have 
paid to the system during their work history. 
Some additional explanations however should be provided in order to understand the 
mechanisms underlying the possibility of the crowding-out effects in the two selected social 
provisions. The explanation of these mechanisms is based on the idea that social trust can be 
considered an attitudinal variable and, hence, the theory of attitudes formation and change can 
be employed for describing the mechanism underlying the crowding-out effects in trust 
among retired people and crowding-in effects among unemployed people.  
Attitude is usually defined as the view of an individual on a specific phenomenon, a 
state of things or an object in real life (Blemberg and Kroll, 2002). There are several factors 
affecting individual’s attitude. First of all, the attitude arises as a consequence of the ideas of 
the desirable – the values internalized by the individual. Or in other words, attitudes can be 
seen as expressions of underlying values. Values are seen here as fundamental and constant 
ideas about what is desirable in principle, and are not connected to any specific phenomena in 
real life. 
 The other factor influencing attitudes towards welfare state system is self-interest. In 
other words the attitudes are interpreted here as expressions of the aspiration of individuals 
and groups to maximize their self-interests. These two approaches – values and self-interests - 
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position on a certain issue in real life, takes into consideration his or her values as well as his 
or her self-interests. Moreover both theories presume that attitudes may change over time.  
Finally, Blemberg and Kroll (2002) define the third group of factors which may claim 
responsible for changes in the attitudes. They refer to Sihvo anad Uusitalo who discuss 
different theoretical approaches that stress the impact of an economic crisis on the attitudes of 
the population. This group comprises three different approaches each of which is in one or 
other way related to the individual’s perception of recent changes in the welfare state.  
A first approach stresses the consequences of the people’s perception of economic 
decline; if a person feels that his or her personal economic situation is being threatened 
(directly or through increase taxation) this is thought to affect negatively his or her wiliness to 
take the common good into consideration through contributing to the financing of the welfare 
system. A second theoretical approach is concerned with the impact on the attitudes of the 
population of influential groups such as politicians, political parties and other organizations, 
etc, and their interpretation of the state of the economy and their views on the interplay 
between social policy and economy. A third approach deals with the impact on attitudes of 
actual changes in the welfare system. Sihvo and Uusitalo (in Blemberg and Kroll, 2002) 
assume that the synchronous effects of more people using the system and a lowering of the 
level of social security that can be a result of an economic crisis, might lead to changes in 
attitudes towards the system. Blemberg and Kroll (2002) present other assumption based on 
different reasoning. They assert that cuts in services are thought to result in vicious circle of 
cutback policies: the lowered standard of public services results in growing dissatisfaction, 
which in turn leads to more positive attitudes towards alternative service—providers and a 
growing pressure to privatize, which results in further lowering of the standard and thus to 
even greater dissatisfaction and negative attitudes towards the public services.   
We will try to explain the mechanism of trust formation using the attitudinal theory 
presented above. In the case of unemployed people, the effects of the welfare state on trust 
levels provide some room for the crowding-out effects. This may happen despite the fact that 
the values of the individuals with respect to providing unemployed with the financial 
resources show some support for the state intervention. It is possible to claim that most people 
base their considerations on the view that unemployed individuals must be in that way or the 
other supported by the state. For instance, Matheson and Wearing (2002) based on the ISSP 
data illustrated that about 52.6% Australians, 74.3 % of Germans, 87.5 Norwegians and 
48.0% Americans declared that the state should assume the responsibility to look after 
unemployed.  This reflects the common view that the risk of becoming unemployed is quite 
high for any individual. Moreover, as Rothstein (1998) showed individuals tend to 
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unemployment programs even if they are based on means-testing.  
Analysis of the values component however does not reveal the mechanism of the 
crowding-out effects. What is responsible for the crowding-out here is precisely the self-
interest of the individuals. High unemployment benefits may encourage people to stay in 
unemployment longer while being unemployed is negatively associated with social capital. 
Unemployment brings relative poverty, on the one hand, and creates, on the other hand, 
sentiments of discrimination and injustice which leads to distrust towards people, collective 
action and society as a whole. Goul Andersen (2002) showed that labour market 
marginalization is related to low political trust which can be easily extrapolated to 
institutional and interpersonal trust. Moreover, he illustrated that in the conditions of 
unemployment there is a polarization between insiders and outsiders of the labour market 
which in our opinion may also undermine pro-social behaviour. Christoforou (2004) as well 
demonstrated that unemployment is an important factor in deciding the level of social capital 
pointing out that the unemployment creates a strong disincentive for group membership. She 
argues that the unemployed lack income to afford group membership or they spend their 
plentiful leisure job-seeking and securing a source of minimum income, rather than 
participating in groups. Additional factors affecting the individual’s incentive to participate 
when facing unemployment might consist in sentiments of distrust he or she develops towards 
other social groups and society as a whole, which are considered to have deprived him or her 
of opportunities for employment and self-development. She refers also to Brehm and Rahn 
who confirmed the negative impact of being unemployed on individual’s sentiments of 
interpersonal trusts.  
As far as the third factors group is concerned, one can hardly apply it to the case of 
unemployment since alternatives to the state’s support of the wellbeing of an individual 
during unemployment hardly exist. To sum up, the attitudinal theory provides some evidence 
of the possibility of the crowding-in effects in social trust among unemployed people. 
However, it as well provides a mechanism of the crowding-out effects for the unemployment. 
The latter consists in the desire of unemployed people to stay in unemployment and get 
unemployment benefits as long as possible when these are high allowing to secure decent 
living standards without entering the labour market. The latter will lead to the erosion of their 
social trust of both forms due to the fact that unemployment negatively affects trust levels. 
But it seems from the empirical results that the value component and the fact that the state 
supports those without any source of income has more weight than negative feeling of being 
at disadvantage compared to others when being unemployed. 
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different form which is not that easy to describe. Both factors: values and self-interests point 
out rather at the existence of the positive relationship between pensions and social trust. The 
values of people towards pension system can be articulated as follows: the retired people 
should be supported by the state. Matheson and Wearing’s (2002) calculations based on the 
ISSP data clearly illustrate this opinion. More precisely, they show that the vast majority of 
the population consider that securing the wellbeing of retired people must be the task of the 
state. In particular, 93.2% of Australians, 92.6% of Germans, 97.8% of Norwegians and 
82.5% of Americans declared that it is a responsibility of the government to look after retired 
people.  
The positive effects of pensions on trust towards public institutions might be 
supported by the fact that for a great portion of retirees, pensions constitute the main source of 
income. Empirics, for instance, show that the share of public pensions in total gross 
household income of all pensioner households amounts to about 80 percent. More precisely, 
this share equals to 80.9% in France, 83.3% in Germany and 75.2 % in Spain (Bönker, 2005).  
The self-interests might affect the attitudes towards public institutions in the same 
direction as the values. This seems to be a result of the fact that everybody is exposed to the 
risk of retirement to the same degree. In other words, retirement is unavoidable for anyone 
and, hence, this must form a positive attitude towards the public pension system forming the 
ground for positive effects of pensions on institutional trust which in turn might affect 
interpersonal trust of an individual.  
Up to now the question about the mechanism of crowding-out in trust levels remains 
open. Values interpretation and self-interests articulation leave no room for the negative 
impact of pensions on trust levels. Here, this is the effects of the third factor of attitudes 
change which can be claimed responsible for the negative influence of trust levels, namely 
that of economic crisis factor.  
The data used stem from the survey conducted in 2002 – the years of the constant 
debates about the need to transform institutional setting underlying pension system in almost 
all countries included in the analysis. It was also years of rapid and sometimes drastic reforms 
in the pension system resulting usually in the reduction of the level of pensions or tightening 
of entitlement conditions. Moreover, it should be noticed that the changes in the pension 
system and the debates accompanied them were larger in the countries where the pension 
expenditures were higher. This can be a ground for negative attitudes of the pensioners 
towards the welfare state, in general, and the pension system, in particular. To adjust 
Blomberg and Kroll’s (2002) statement, the logic of reasoning looks as follows: the constant 
reductions in pensions and change in entitlement conditions produce a negative attitude of 
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growing dissatisfaction among population which in its turn leads to a more positive attitude 
towards alternative sources, namely privatized pensions. This dissatisfaction with the pension 
system is supported by the fact that pensioners are among the people least satisfied with their 
income. As the WVS’s data show, the level of satisfaction with the income among retired 
people on average equals to 3.7 almost double less than that for employed full-time (6.2) or 
part-time (5.5). The dissatisfaction of retired with their income may also have some side-
effects on their trust levels towards pension system, in particular, and public institutions, in 
general. They may create incentives for the middle and upper classes to search social security 
not in the public but in private sector (Forma, 2002) reflecting the undermined confidence 
towards public welfare state institutions. This dissatisfaction with welfare state institutions is 
also supported by Goul-Andersen’s findings (2002) which showed that old-aged pensioners 
are most negative towards welfare state.  
To some up, the effects of recent changes in pensions’ level and conditions of their 
delivery may ruin individuals’ level of trust towards the national pension system and in 
general towards public institutions, leading to increased uncertainty and pessimism among 
their direct recipients and the population as a whole. The latter contributes to the negative 
experience which in its turn may erode individuals’ trust towards other people.  
 
Outcome dimension  
The outcome dimension investigates how the processes of decommodification and 
social stratification affect social trust scores. The analysis of welfare state effects on social 
trust measured through welfare regime dummies provides evidence of quite a large gap in the 
trust levels across welfare regimes. Table 2 illustrates that both forms of trust - institutional 
and interpersonal - possess significantly lower values in the liberal and conservative welfare 
regimes compared to Scandinavian one. More specifically, institutional trust in Scandinavian 
nations is on average 3.301 points higher than in Anglo-Saxon countries, and 2.313 points 
higher compared to conservative Europe. There is also a statistically significant difference in 
institutional trust levels between the liberal and conservative welfare regimes. The value in 
the former differs from that in the latter by on average 0.988 points.  
The same tendency is present when analyzing variation in interpersonal trust levels 
across welfare regimes. According to the results of our analysis, Scandinavian nations have 
on average interpersonal trust levels which are 1.535 points higher than in conservative 
Europe and 1.974 points higher compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. Apart from that, an 
additional analysis shows that there is a statistically significant difference in the level of 
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The latter is higher than the former by on average 0.439 points.  
Thus, the preliminary analysis points out at the existence of a certain relationship 
between welfare regime types and social trust. Those welfare states which spend more on 
wellbeing of their residents tend to have higher trust levels among their population. Although 
it is very straightforward to link welfare regime types only to the level of spending since they 
differ as well in the level of decommodification and the form of social stratification.  
Specification of the outcome dimension reveals the fact that in some cases the 
crowding-out is present in the relationship between social policy outcomes and social trust 
levels. More specifically, the generosity of social benefits which guarantees high levels of 
decommodification usually leads to the crowding-out effects in both forms of social trust 
interpersonal and institutional (see Table 3). This is completely consistent with the previous 
analysis which showed that the total social expenditures negatively correlate with the social 
trust among the whole population. It seems that not only the high social spending leads to the 
erosion of confidence in its both forms, but also the level of decommodification may entrain 
some loss in the social trust levels.  
Stratification affects social trust elements in different ways (see Table 4). Preserving 
existing class structure inherent to the conservative welfare regime type influences positively 
institutional trust, but negatively interpersonal trust. Providing the individual with financial 
support helps to build here high regards about public institutions resulting in high confidence 
towards them. But preserving existing class structure which may entrain the feeling of being 
at disadvantage among less lucky individuals entrains erosion of confidence towards other 
individuals. Stigmatizing-like approach apt to the liberal welfare state erodes both 
interpersonal and institutional trust. Poor relief lying at the roots of the Anglo-Saxon tradition 
to provide welfare which is characterized with the prevalence of means-tested schemes, low 
social benefits and high inequality in the society seems to generate low regards about public 
institutions, as well as about other individuals. And, finally, socialist universal approach 
aimed at guaranteeing individual independence and provision of universal social rights was 
found to lead to the crowding-out in institutional trust, but the crowding-in in interpersonal 
one. It is difficult to explain here why the socialism is negatively associated with institutional 
trust. This negative effect is most probably not the result of social processes, but rather the 
outcome of the way the measure of socialism was constructed, or in other words, a technical 
problem. The latter included two main measures: the average portion of the workforce eligible 
for benefits in three social insurance programs (unemployment, sickness and old-age pensions) 
and the benefit equality measure based on the ratio of basic benefit to maximum allowable 
benefit averaged over the same three programs. This approach to defining the measure of 
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first of all, because of their high coverage rates of the workforce by the major social programs. 
And, second, because the low levels of basic and maximum benefits resulted in the high ratio 
of these two. The high scores of liberal countries on socialism in combination with low levels 
of institutional trust among their population can be considered responsible for the negative 
sign of socialist effects on the institutional trust. 
 
Qualitative  dimension  
The qualitative dimension tries to measure the effects of social provisions’ design, 
delivery and mode of financing on social trust levels. Here, the empirical analysis provides 
more consistency in the results. More specifically, spending on both active as well as passive 
social measures enhance social trust formation (see Table 5) which is in line with the positive 
effect of unemployment spending obtained in the functional dimension. Moreover, this 
positive impact is to some extent stronger for passive measures rather than for active ones. 
People hence tend to appreciate more the welfare efforts which bring immediate results, like 
cash benefits, but they react less on the activation measures whose results are remote in time 
and less immediately visible.  
When analyzing the effects of universalism and categorization on social trust, we 
obtain mixed results (Table 6). Relating the percentage of coverage to institutional trust 
reveals negative relationship or in other words crowding-out effects. In the case of 
interpersonal trust, this relationship was found positive with quite a high value of the 
coefficient. Higher coverage rates hence crowd-out the institutional trust, but crowd-in the 
interpersonal trust. The high percentage of coverage among population results in the fact that 
people feel to be treated by the welfare state in the same way or equally fair as others which 
forms necessary preconditions for high trust evaluations towards other people. But it seems to 
be not enough for building high regards about public welfare institutions. The crowding-out 
effects found here in institutional trust are in line with the negative impact of the socialism on 
institutional trust revealed while analyzing the outcome dimension.  
The opposite relationship was found when relating the measure of categorization to 
social trust levels. More specifically, an increase in the number of occupationally distinct 
pensions increases the institutional trust, but decreases the interpersonal trust. It seems that it 
does not matter a lot for the institutional trust through how many occupationally distinct 
schemes the pensions are provided. What matters here is that the retired people are provided 
with financial support, even if this happens through different pension funds. This, however, 
conducts essential influence on the level of interpersonal trust. The fact that there is a certain 
categorization in pension provisions might affect people’s perception of how just the pension 
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through segregated pension funds may create among certain groups of retirees a feeling of 
being at disadvantage compared to others which negatively affects the level of confidence 
towards other people. Segregation of pension provisions happening as a result of high 
categorization of pension funds also enhances inequality among pensioners which also 
negatively influences interpersonal trust levels.  
Another characteristic of the welfare state development includes the division between 
cash and in-kind benefits which as well show a certain relationship with social trust (Table 7). 
With respect to institutional trust, the correlation was found to be positive in the case of cash 
benefits, but negative in the case of in-kind ones. It is possible to assume that cash benefits 
are more easily observable by the people to be judged as the state support when one has 
difficulties. The latter forms the necessary precondition for positive evaluation of the state by 
individuals which results in the high levels of trust towards welfare institutions. The in-kind 
benefits are, on the contrary, less observable and as such they are less appreciated by their 
recipients.  
Interpersonal trust shows as well certain correlation with both types of social spending. 
The sign of this relationship was found negative in both cases. The analysis hence reveals that 
regardless of the form of benefits’ provision, one should account for the crowding-out effects 
in interpersonal trust. In total, the division of expenditures on the basis of the form of their 
provision only confirmed the results found in the case of total social spending which consisted 
in the strong crowding-out effects in the confidence towards other people.  
One should also analyze the effects of mode of financing on social trust level (Table 8). 
Individual level of analyses indicates that general taxation has a more positive effect on social 
trust compared to social contributions. An increase in contributory mode of financing leads to 
a decrease in social trust levels. On the contrary to that, an increase in the proportion of social 
benefits financed through general taxation increases the value of interpersonal as well as 
institutional trust.  
In the case of general taxation versus contributions, it is difficult to find a scientifically 
acceptable explanation of the effects mode of financing may have on social trust. Most 
probably, one should take here into account the tax burden visibility. If an individual feels 
that his or her personal economic situation is being threatened through increased taxation, this 
may affect negatively his or her wiliness to take the common good into consideration when 
building confidence towards public welfare institutions. High tax burden may hence 
undermine institutional trust and as such lead to lower levels of interpersonal trust. Since 
social contributions are more visible than general taxation, we can expect that the former will 
affect social trust more negatively than the latter. 
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covariates on the basis of the ESS in general confirmed the relationship usually described in 
the literature. Higher GDP per capita is usually associated with higher interpersonal and 
institutional trust which indicates that wealthier countries have on average more trusting 
societies. In several instances however the negative correlation between wealth and 
institutional trust was obtained which reveals that in some cases people living in wealthier 
countries may have lower levels of confidence towards public institutions.  
Inequality effects are in line with the previous findings, namely, higher levels of 
income inequality was found to erode both form of trust – institutional and interpersonal. The 
same direction of the relationship is obtained for fractionalization: the more fragmented the 
society is, the lower are the scores on confidence towards public institutions and other people. 
Corruption level was found as well affecting social trust indicators. In less corrupted societies, 
the individuals are usually more trusting with respect to both - other people and public 
institutions. Percentage of Protestants living in the country appeared to be also a positive 
determinant of trust levels. Where the percentage of Protestants is high, the social trust levels 
among individuals are usually as well high.  
Volunteering was found to enhance both forms of trust – institutional and 
interpersonal. Meeting friends frequently outside work as well positively affects social trust 
levels. Religion appeared to negatively affect trust indicators and this is even more so in the 
case of institutional trust. Catholics and Protestants were found to be less trusty towards 
welfare state institutions compared to non religious people. Other religions seem to matter 
little when talking about the institutional, as well as interpersonal trust. What matters here 
more is in fact how religious the individual is. The frequency of church attendance, which 
reveals the extent of individual’s religiosity, was found to influence positively social trust 
levels. Positive influence on trust indicators was also obtained for life satisfaction variable. 
People more satisfied with their life tend to have higher scores on both institutional and 
interpersonal trust.  
The analysis on the basis of the ESS data provided more evidence of a gender gap in 
trust levels. Almost in all cases, the results point out that males usually have more confidence 
towards welfare state institutions and other individuals compared to females. The effect of the 
age seems to be ambiguous. On the one hand, we found no difference in the level of 
institutional trust between people aged 15-29 and those aged 30-44. On the other hand, those 
over 45 appeared to be least trusting compared to other age groups. The effects of the age on 
interpersonal trust however follow a different path. Those aged 30-44 were found to have 
higher interpersonal trust than those under 30. With age the positive effect tends to slow down 
  21since those over 45 show more trust compared to youngest-aged group, but less trust 
compared to middle-aged group.  
The effect of political stance again differs depending on trust type. People adhering to 
right-centered views usually have higher institutional trust but lower interpersonal trust. And 
vice versa, those supporting leftist values tend to have lower institutional trust but higher 
interpersonal trust. The employment status seems to matter little in defining trust levels. 
Although the sign of the coefficient was obtained negative indicating that unemployed people 
tend to have less institutional and interpersonal trust compared to employed respondents, the 
significance test failed to confirm this.  
Education can be considered as well a strong predictor of social trust levels. More 
educated people have usually higher scores on institutional and interpersonal trust. This effect 
is however non linear in the case of institutional trust: highly educated people seem to differ 
little in their trust levels from middle educated, although both of them differ quite a lot in 
confidence towards public institutions from low-educated individuals.  
Non linear effect on trust levels was obtained as well for income which seems to 
follow the U-shaped pattern. First, the effect of income is negative indicating that an increase 
in income level decreases institutional trust. But this happens till certain point – for first three 
quintiles. Afterwards, an increase in income can be regarded as a positive covariate of 
confidence towards public institutions. In the case of interpersonal trust the effect of income 
level is always positive, but statistically significant mostly for two upper quintiles. 
 
8. Conclusions  
 
The analysis of the relationship between social trusts and welfare state is subject of 
lots of research. Despite of the diversity of analytical approaches, they all have one thing in 
common - operationalization of the welfare state development is done through social spending 
measured as a percentage of GDP. This automatically entrains the linearity of social policies 
and forms the assumption that all social spending counts equally. As a result they ignore the 
fact that welfare state expenditures actually consist of bunch of policies and have their own 
specific structure as well as characteristics reflecting the countries’ peculiar institutional, 
political, historical, cultural and economic features. 
This narrow operationalization of the predictor triggers the need to find new ways in 
measuring the effects welfare state conducts on social trust. This paper proposes to use a 
multidimensional principle in studying the relationship between welfare state and social trust. 
More specifically, we define three axes around which the multidimensionality is formed. The 
first axis is functional which is specified on the basis of functions social policy performs. The 
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spending) to social trust among their direct recipients. The second axis is outcome which 
relates the outcomes of social policy to the level of trust among the whole population. In the 
frame of outcome dimension we analyze the effects of decommodification and stratification 
on social trust. The third axis is qualitative which is formed on the basis of specification of 
social policy characteristics. We account here for social policy institutional design, form of 
provision and mode of financing. 
The analysis of each dimension supported the plausibility of the idea about multi-
dimensionality of welfare states. Specification of social spending on functional basis revealed 
that crowding-out effects can be expected in the case of pension policy while crowding-in in 
the case of unemployment policy advocating hence for the presence of policy specific effects.  
Outcome dimension suggested that benefit generosity index shows negative 
correlation with social trust levels. The analysis of the impact of social stratification process 
provided mixed results. With respect to institutional trust, crowding-out effects are expected 
among individuals living in the countries scoring high on liberalism and socialism. With 
respect to interpersonal trust, the crowding-out effects can usually be found in the countries 
where conservative or liberal stratification mechanisms prevail.   
The analysis of qualitative dimension provided evidence advocating for the need of 
taking into account the social policy characteristics when studying the instances of social trust 
erosion. Division between active and passive labor market policies seems to matter little since 
both of them tend to enhance social trust formation. What matters here is rather the forms of 
social provisions: benefits paid in cash were found to positively correlate with institutional 
trust, but negatively with confidence towards other people. In-kind benefits appeared to 
undermine social trust levels in its both forms. Another important social policy characteristic 
is the mode of financing. Financing through social contributions seems to affect negatively 
social trust levels, while general taxation on the contrary tends to raise trust levels among 
population. Provision of social benefits on universal basis was found to erode institutional 
trust but enhance interpersonal trust. Categorization of social benefits provision by contrast 
enhances interpersonal trust, but negatively affects institutional trust.  
Our analysis also points out at the lack of the theory which may explain the effects 
each social policy has on social capital. It seems that there are many direct and indirect links 
between two variables of interest through which the effect materializes. It is difficult to 
restrict causal mechanism to traditional assumption about reciprocal ties and civic 
engagement as well as to more recent one about the reduction of inequality. They might be 
specific for each policy and involve in its turn multidimensional effect structure. To sum up, 
additional theoretical and empirical research is still needed to explore and explain the 
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  26Table 1.: Regression of individual-level and country-level variables on social trust  
 
Institutional trust   
 







































-0.029*** -0.018*  0.026  0.013*** 0.008**  0.010 
Inequality  
 
-1.6444***  -1.049*** 0.509 -0.112*** 0.017  0.404** 
Corruption  
 
0.451*** -0.188  0.138  0.293*** 0.372  0.574*** 
% of Protestants  
 
0.026***  0.017*** 0.028** 0.007***  0.006***  0.005 
Fractionalization  
 
-3.571*** -3.474***  -3.308*  0.186  0.235  -0.906 
Volunteering  
 
0.180*** 0.013  0.216 0.078***  0.079*** 0.007 
Sociability 
 







































-0.396***  -0.405*** -0.463** -0.054***  -0.036  0.004 
Gender  
 
0.545*** 0.393**  0.434  0.049*  0.083  0.008 
Age 
15-29 
30 – 44 























































Political stance  
 
0.088*** 0.056  -0.150  -0.040***  -0.020  -0.113*** 
Unemployed  
 
-0.278 -0.576***  Not 
applicable 



















































Life satisfaction  
 
0.631*** 0.630*** 0.552*** 0.219*** 0.221*** 0.206*** 
Adjusted R sq.  
 
0.174 0.147 0.151 0.154 0.146 0.206 
  27Table 2.: Interpersonal and institutional trust by welfare regime type  
Institutional trust   
 





































30 – 44 


























































































































Life satisfaction  
 










  28Table 3.: Impact of decommodification on social trust levels  
Institutional trust   
 
             Interpersonal trust   
Benefit generosity index  
 
Benefit generosity index  
 


















































30 – 44 
























































Life satisfaction   0.624*** 
 
0.218*** 
Adjusted R sq.  
 
0.178 0.155 
  29Table 4.: Impact of stratification on social trust levels 
Institutional trust  
 
             Interpersonal trust   
Conservatism   Liberalism  Socialism  
 


































   





0.012*** 0.021***  0.010*** 0.012*** 0.013***  0.0014*** 
Inequality  
 
-0.825*** -1.060***  -0.816*** -0.137***  -0.011  -0.017 
% of Protestants  
 
0.026*** 0.025***  0.026*** 0.006*** 0.006***  0.006*** 
Fractionalization  
 
-0.073*** -0.680***  -0.991***  0.005  0.115  0.180 
Corruption  
 
-0.087 0.226***  -0.039 0.222***  0.353***  0.312*** 
Volunteering  
 
0.178*** 0.173***  0.183*** 0.075*** 0.077***  0.076*** 
Sociability 
 
































-0.416*** -0.407***  -0.120*** -0.058*** -0.054***  -0.058*** 
Gender  
 
0.551*** 0.543***  0.553***  0.048*  0.048*  0.048* 
Age 
15-29 
30 – 44 
























































Political stance  
 
0.089*** 0.091***  0.087*** -0.039***  -0.039***  -0.040*** 
Unemployed  
 
-0.234 -0.245  -0.201 -0.060 -0.052  -0.056 
Income 
1














































Life satisfaction  
 
0.634*** 0.631***  0.634*** 0.219*** 0.219***  0.220*** 
Adjusted R sq.  
 
0.173 0.173  0.174 0.155 0.154  0.154 
  30Table 5.: Impact of active and passive labor market policies on social trust levels 
 








 Active  labour 

































-0.020*** -0.008**    0.016***  0.021***   
Inequality  
 
-1.247*** 0.752***    -0.100***  -0.188***   
% of Protestants  
 
0.025*** 0.031***    0.007***  0.009***   
Fractionalization  
 
-0.142*** 0.329***    -0.015  -0.417***   
Corruption  
 
0.246*** 0.638***    0.294***  0.128***   
Volunteering  
 
0.171*** 0.193***    0.079***  0.0888***   
Sociability  
 

























-0.420*** -0.406***    -0.055***  -0.052***   




30 – 44 










































Political stance   0.092*** 
 
0.077***    -0.041***  -0.046***   
Unemployed   -0.240 
 
-0.277    -0.059  -0.070   
Income 
1



































Life satisfaction  
 
0.632*** 0.621***    0.221***  0.213***   
Adjusted R sq.  
 
0.174 0.178    0.156  0.163   
  31Table 6.: Impact of universalism and categorization on social trust levels  








































-0.005 -0.019***    0.013***  0.015***   
Inequality  
 
-0.822*** -0.998***    -0.046  -0.062*   
% of Protestants  
 
0.023*** 0.026***    0.007***  0.007***   
Fractionalization  
 
-2.021*** -0.397***    -0.026  0.159   
Corruption  
 
0.245*** 0.204***    0.239***  0.270***   
Volunteering  
 
0.167*** 0.178***    0.078***  0.074***   
Sociability  
 

























-0.421*** -0.417***    -0.057***  -0.057***   
Gender  
 
0.550*** 0.549***    0.049***  0.049   
Age 
15-29 
30 – 44 













































-0.230 -0.235    -0.056  -0.061   
Income 
1


































Life satisfaction  
 
0.625*** 0.634***    0.221***  0.219***   
Adjusted R sq.  
 
0.176 0.173    0.155  0.155   
  32 Table 7.: Impact of forms of benefits provision on social trust levels 
Institutional trust  Interpersonal trust  
 
 
Cash benefits   In-kind benefits 
 
  Cash benefits  
 
In-kind benefits    
 
 
Cash benefits  
 
















-0.012*** -0.032***    0.013*** 0.013***   
Inequality  
 
-0.595*** -1.503***    -0.173*** -0.065**   
% of Protestants  
 
0.030*** 0.037***    0.005***  0.008***   
Fractionalization  
 
-0.432*** -0.955***    0.193  0.135   
Corruption  
 
0.148** 0.455***    0.276***  0.300***   
Volunteering  
 
0.169*** 0.191***    0.078***  0.080***   
Sociability  
 

























-0.432*** -0.378***    -0.052***  -0.052***   
Gender  
 
0.552*** 0.191***    0.048*  0.049   
Age 
15-29 
30 – 44 













































-0.228 -0.273    -0.060  -0.057   
Income 
1



































Life satisfaction   0.631*** 0.625***    0.220***  0.219*** 
 
 
Adjusted R sq.  
 
0.174 0.177    0.155  0.155   
  33Table 8.: Impact of mode of financing on social trust levels  
 
Institutional trust  Interpersonal trust  
 
 
Contributions   General  
Taxation  























-0.025*** -0.031***    0.012*** 0.009***   
Inequality  
 
-1.319*** -1.396***    -0.086** -0.131***   
% of Protestants   0.025*** 0.014***   
 
0.006*** 0.002*   
Fractionalization  
 
-0.938*** -0.960***    0.326**  0.292**   
Corruption  
 
0.510*** 0.316***    0.245***  0.314***   
Volunteering  
 
0.172*** 0.177***    0.076***  0.078***   
Sociability  
 

























-0.409*** -0.374***    -0.055***  -0.040***   
Gender  
 
0.545*** 0.521***    0.049*  0.039   
Age 
15-29 
          
Ref/category   Ref/category 
30 – 44 






Ref/category  Ref/category 
0.099**  0.108** 
0.085**  0.104** 
Education            








Ref/category  Ref/category 
0.217***  0.228*** 
0.441***  0.439*** 
Political stance   0.089*** 0.091***    -0.040***  -0.039***   
 
Unemployed   -0.293 -0.277    -0.069  -0.066   
 
Income            
1

















Ref/category  Ref/category 
0.050  0.041 
0.078*  0.085** 
0.181***  0.194*** 
0.176*  0.227** 
Life satisfaction   0.629*** 0.621***    0.218***  0.215***   
 
Adjusted R sq.   0.174 0.175    0.155  0.157   
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